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defendant maker is estopped. Estoppel is invoked by the court be-
cause creditors suffered a loss by continuing to do business with the
bank on the assumption that the bank was solvent.8  If, however,
the bank had not failed and then brought suit in its own name, it
would seem that the action should fail, and the original agreement
between the bank and the maker should prevail.9 The creditors
have sustained no loss and the doctrine of estoppel need not be
applied.' 0 And, therefore, even if the receiver should bring suit, it
would seem that he should collect, not the face value of the note but
only to the extent of the loss suffered by the creditors." New York
courts, however, have extended the doctrine of estoppel in favor of
both receivers and banks regardless of loss to creditors.12
It is submitted that the rule that the maker of a note of this
kind should be held liable is sound. The only practical way to en-
force this policy is to make him pay. In the recent case of In re
Hudson River Trust Co.,13 a director gave his note to the trust com-
pany to be repaid when the financial conditions of the bank improved.
The bank failed. The estate of the director was estopped from set-
ting up the defense of no consideration, since the note was listed as
assets in the published statements of the bank, and the depositors
had relied upon it. This estoppel, invoked by the court to protect
the unwary bank depositor against fraud is rooted in what has been
termed "good morals and sound public policy." 14
S. L.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS-
DISCRIMINATION ON BASIS OF WELL ADVERTISED TRADE NAME-
DENIAL TO NEWCOMERS OF MILK PRICE DIFFERENTIAL.-Pursuant
to an amendment to the New York Milk Control Act,' permitting
price fixing in the milk industry, discrimination was made between
8 Niblack v. Farley, 286 IIl. 536, 122 N. E. 160 (1910); Prudential
Trust Co. v. Cronin, 245 Mass. 311, 139 N. E. 645 (1923).
' First National Bank v. Felt, 100 Iowa 680, 69 N. W. 1057 (1896).
10 Ibid.
'Payne v. Burnham, 62 N. Y. 71 (1875); see note 7, mupra ("The re-
ceiver sues to protect private rights, not to punish falsifiers").
"Hurd v. Kelly, 78 N. Y. 588 (1879) (suit brought by receiver) ; Best
v. Thiel, 79 N. Y. 15 (1879) (suit brought by receiver); County Trust Co.
v. Mara, 242 App. Div. 206, 273 N. Y. Supp. 597 (1st Dept. 1934), aff'd,
266 N. Y. 540, 195 N. E. 190 (1935) (suit brought by bank); Bay Park-
way National Bank v. Shalom, 270 N. Y. 172, 200 N. E. 685 (1936) (suit
brought by bank).
'In re Hudson River Trust Co., fi re Gifford's Estate, - App. Div. -
(3d Dept. 1936), 287 N. Y. Supp. 916 (1936).
1" Best v. Thiel, 79 N. Y. 15 (1879); Schmid v. Haynes, 115 N. J. Law.
271, 178 Atl. 801 (1935).
N. Y. LAws 1935, c. 158.
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dealers who had and dealers who had not well advertised trade names,
by permitting the latter to sell bottled milk in New York City at a
price one cent less per quart than the price prescribed for the former.
Plaintiff, a firm having a well advertised trade, name, challenges the
statute as a violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th
Amendment. Held, the discrimination was reasonable. The factual
data in the record indicate that the statute seeks to preserve a trade
practice which existed prior to its passage when dealers without well
advertised brands were able to compete for the trade in question,
only by slightly underselling their well advertised competitors. Rey-
nolds, Sutherland, Butler and Van Devanter, JJ., dissented. Bor-
den's Farm Products Co. Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 251, 56 Sup.
Ct. 453 (1936).
To prevent economic chaos in the milk business which might
have resulted froh wholesale invasion by those seeking to take ad-
vantage of the price differential statute passed April '10, 1933, the
legislature amended the Milk Control Act so that those entering the
milk business after April 10, 1933 could not take advantage of the
one cent price differential. Plaintiff, a firm without a well advertised
trade name, was denied a relicense because it sold milk at one cent
less than the fixed minimum. On certiorari, plaintiff challenges the
constitutionality of the statute on the ground that discrimination be-
tween dealers entering before and after April 10, 1933, violates the
equal protection clause. Held, the discrimination is arbitrary and un-
reasonable; it violates the equal protection clause. No factual data
was submitted to sustain the discrimination. Cardozo, Brandeis and
Stone, JJ., dissented. Mayflower Farms Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S.
266, 56 Sup. Ct. 457 (1936).
The narrow governmental power of price fixing, restricted to
industries "affected with a public interest", seemed to have been sub-
stantially enlarged by the historic case of Nebbia v. New York.2 But
the recent decision of People ex rel. Tipaldo v. Morehead 3 dealing
with the New York minimum wage statute makes the applicable
scope of the Nebbia case seem doubtful. 4 The two instant cases fairly
present a related problem. Granted the power of industrial regula-
tion, to what extent can the legislature pass ancillary measures to
fulfill the end? Prior to the Nebbia case, the court had arrogated to
' Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 56 Sup. Ct. 829 (1934) (sustained
constitutionality of price fixing in New York milk industry). See Note (1933)
42 YALE L. J. 1259; Hale, The Constitution and the Price System: Some Re-
flections on Nebbia v. New York (1934) 34 Co.. L. REv. 401; Goldsmith and
Winks, Price Fixing: From Nebbia to Gitffey (1936) 31 ILr. L. REV. 179;
Manley, Constitutionality of Regulating Milk as a Public Utility (1933) 18
CORN. L. Q. 410; Merrill, The New Judicial Approach to Due Process and
Price Fixing (1929) 18 Ky. L. J. 3.
'Morehead v. People ex rel. Tipaldo, - U. S. -, 56 Sup. Ct. 918 (1936).
See dissenting opinions of Hughes, C. J., and Stone, J.
'The separate dissenting opinions of Hughes, C. J., and Stone, J., in More-
head v. People ex rel. Tipaldo, - U. S. -, 56 Sup. Ct. 926, 932 (1936),
clearly imply that the Nebbia case would be a sufficient ratia decidendi
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itself the function of declaring what industries were "affected with a
public interest". 5 Will it now assume to answer how far the legis-
lature can go in detailed regulatory measures? There is no issue
where the legislation is arbitrary or capricious. 6
In the Borden's Farm Products case, the majority seemed to
find little difficulty in sustaining the legislation with the factual data
before it. A vigorous minority seemed to be influenced more by their
dissenting opinion in the Nebbia case than by a consideration of the
case before it.7 But a few minutes after this decision, two of the
majority judges, Hughes, C. J., and Roberts, J., appeared to com-
pletely reverse themselves by declaring unconstitutional the time limi-
tation in the Mayflower Farms case.8 While the main opinion de-
clared that no facts in the record were before it to justify the dis-
criminatory classification between dealers in the milk business before
April 10, 1933 and those entering thereafter, it was yet confronted
with the legal presumption of constitutionality.9 The presumption
might have been overcome by facts showing the statute to be dis-
criminatory. 10 But the appeal came on certiorari to the highest New
York court which affirmed a determination of the Commissioner of
'Finkelstein, From Munn v. Illinois to Tyson v. Banton, A Study in the
Judicial Process (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 769; Hamilton, Affectation With a
Public Interest (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1089; McAllister, Lord Hale and Business
Affected With a Public Interest (1930) 43 HARV. L. REv. 759; Goldsmith and
WVinks, loc. cit. supra, note 1.
'Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R., 222 U. S. 541, 32
Sup. Ct. 108 (1911) ; St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S.
38, 56 Sup. Ct. 720 (1936).
McReynolds, J., dissenting at page 264, in the Borden's Products case,
"In Nebbia v. New York * * * we stated reasons in support of the conclusion
that the New York Milk Control Act of 1933 infringed the due process clause.
We adhere to what we there said." Cf. Stone, J., dissenting in Morehead v.
People ex rel. Tipaldo, - U. S. -, 56 Sup. Ct. 932, 933 (1936), "It is difficult
to imagine any grounds other than our own personal ecowomic predilections, for
saying that the contract of employment is any the less an appropriate subject of
legislation than our scores of others, in dealing with which this Court has held
that legislatures may curtail individual freedom in the public interest." (Italics
supplied.)
' Cardozo, J., dissenting in the Mayflower Farms case at 459, "The judg-
ment just announced is irreconcilable in principle, with the judgment in the
Borden's case, announced a minute or so earlier."
0 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 537, 56 Sup. Ct. 829 (1934); Ohio
ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 630 (1927) ; Lawrence
v. State Tax Comm., 286 U. S. 276, 52 Sup. Ct. 556 (1932) ; cf. Borden's Farm
Products v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 55 Sup. Ct. 187 (1934). Note (1936) 36
COL. L. REV. 283 (presumption of constitutionality reconsidered).
" Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105, 49 Sup. Ct. 57 (1928). See
Notes (1923) 37 -ARv. L. REv. 136, (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 136. The data
submitted in the Nebbia and the Borden's Products Corp. cases were very ex-
tensive. A prior appeal in the Borden's case was in vain because of the absence
of factual data, 293 U. S. 194, 55 Sup. Ct. 183 (1934). See lower court opinion
in the Borden's Farm Products case, 7 F. Supp. 352 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1934).
See Bikle, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Canstitu-
tional Validity of Legislative Action (1924) 38 HAD,- L. REV. 331; Note (1936)
49 HARv. L. REv. 631.
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Markets." No rebutting facts were on the record.' 2  Certainly the
classification could not be declared arbitrary upon its face when the
court had available the data in the Nebbia and Borden Products
Corp. cases of which it could take judicial notice.13 The court has
held that a classification based upon a reasonable distinction is valid,
even though some inequalities result in practice.' 4 It has insisted that
nothing short of "a clear and hostile determination" is invalid.'15 The
object of time limitation in the Mayflower Farms case was not, as the
majority said, to give one class an economic advantage over another.
This may have resulted incidentally; the main object, of course, was
to relieve an economic situation which the court had already author-
ized the state legislature to do. The problem was one for the legis-
lature. When that body once determined that the time limitation had
a reasonable relation to its desired purpose, and the facts reasonably
justified that belief, it acted within its jurisdiction which the court
had no right to invade. 16 As indicated by the Mayflower Farms
case, the court may narrow its decision in the Nebbia case to a point
of ineffectiveness by rejection of detailed regulations which are num-
berless in some industries, particularly the milk industry.
17
T.B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS OF LAW-PRICE FIXING
--REGULATION OF LABOR CONDITIONs-BITUMINOUS COAL ACT.-
Plaintiff, as a stockholder, sues to enjoin the defendant company and
some of its officers from complying with the provisions of the Bitu-
' Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 267 N. Y. 9, 195 N. E. 532 (1935),
aff'g, 242 App. Div. 881, 275 N. Y. Supp. 669 (3d Dept. 1934).This is the reason for the decision in the Mayflower Farms case. But
the court has said in Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S.
580, 584, 55 Sup. Ct. 538, 540 (1935), "A statutory discrimination will not be
set aside as the denial of equal protection of the laws if any state of facts rea-
sonably may be conceived to justify it." It requires no convolutions of the
imagination to conceive a state of facts to justify the discrimination in the
Mayflower Farms case.
"WIG ORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2579.
" Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 33 Sup. Ct. 441 (1930).
'Bell's Gap. R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 237, 10 Sup. Ct. 533
(1890).
"'Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation (1924) 37 HARV. L. REv. 338. Dis-
senting in the A. A. A. case, Stone, J., said, "The power of courts to declare
a statute unconstitutional is subject to two guiding principles * * *. One is
that courts are concerned only with the power to enact statutes, not with their
wisdom. The other is that while unconstitutional exercise of power by the execu-
tive and legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial restraint,
the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-
restraint." United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936).
" Goldsmith and Winks, loc. cit. .rupra, note 2, at page 185. See (1936)
49 HARv. L. REv. 996.
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